Introduction
There are increasing fears that trade reform --and globalization more generally --will increase the uncertainty faced by the average worker, particularly those with fewer skills. As argued by Rodrik (1997) , the increased competitiveness of product markets and the greater access to foreign inputs have led to a more elastic demand for workers. This leads to greater volatility in the labor market since bad shocks to output translate to larger impacts on wages and employment than formerly was the case. Further, the increased elasticity for unskilled workers has also been posited as contributing to the increase in wage dispersion observed with liberalization, and particularly the relative worsening of unskilled relative to skilled workers.
In the "North", a considerable empirical literature has been devoted to the study of the effects of increased imports of manufacturing goods from third world countries on the increasing levels of wage inequality and unemployment of the United States and Europe.'
On the particular issue of demand elasticities, Slaughter (1997) estimated labor demand elasticities for U.S. manufacturing industries and found that from 1960 through 1990 the demand for production labor did become more elastic in most industries although it is not clear, whether increased trade was the cause.
Among LDCs the literature is almost as thin. Estimating static demand equations using micro-panel data from Turkey, Chinoy, Krishna and Mitra (1999) find no impact of ' Although conflicting results have been obtained, standard studies of factor content indicate that trade accounts for 10 to 20 percent of the fall in demand for unskilled labor (Freeman, 1995: 25) . Thus, it has been argued that skill-biased technological change can explain most of the shift in demand away from unskilled towards skilled labor, at least in the U.S. manufacturing industries (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994) . 1 the liberalization of trade on demand elasticities. Using monthly Brazilian manufacturing survey data and broadly following Slaughter, Paes de Barros, Corseuil and Gonzaga.
(1999) regress a series of sequentially generated coefficients on both the own wage and lagged employment on aggregate total trade (exports + imports) over GDP. They find no impact of trade openness on either. Using aggregate manufacturing data from Uruguay at the two digit level, Cassoni, Allen and Labadie (1999) find a negative impact of sectoral total trade/GDP on the lagged employment coefficient. While implying more rapid adjustment, it also leads to a lower total own wage elasticity, the opposite of that predicted.
This paper first asks whether, theoretically, it is obvious that increased trade should increase own wage elasticities. Though a complete model of all the predicted effects is intractable, we do point out where the link between the two may not be tight. The paper then uses establishment level data to provide consistent dynamic estimates of labor demand functions for three Latin American countries across trade policy regimes.
Estimation is done following Arellano and Bond's GMM in differences approach. 2 
II. Labor Demand and Trade Liberalization
Trade reform might affect own wage elasticities through at least three channels: substitutability of inputs, product demand elasticities, and the degree of collusion in the 2 Micro-panel data offer more precise estimates of demand functions, allow factor prices to be taken as exogenous, permit compensation for unobserved heterogeneity, and permit distinguishing changes in parameters arising from firm behavior versus the entry end exit of firms into the industry. Despite those benefits, and probably due to the larger efforts associated with generating micro data sets, only a small fraction of the nearly two hundred empirical studies of labor demand functions reviewed by Hamermesh (1993) where m is the share of factor expenditures in costs, a is the Allen elasticity of substitution, and il is the product demand elasticity. This suggests that as the elasticity of substitution with other factors rises (the first term) or the product-demand elasticity rises (the second, "scale" effect) so does the derived demand elasticity. However, these formulations assume perfect competition and linearly homogeneous cost functions. Much of the advance in modem trade theory has occurred at the frontier of the industrial organization literature where increasing returns to scale and collusive behavior are the nornm Further, the reduction in collusive behavior is one expected outcome of trade reform that clearly cannot be viewed within a competitive model.
The linkfrom product to labor demand elasticities under imperfect competition.
As one example of the complications market power introduces, Maurice and Ferguson (1973) derived expressions for derived factor demand under monopoly and without the assumption of linear homogeneity in costs:
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(1) (7m-qmc) where e is a term.capturing.-economies of scale, yI is fhe expenditure elasticity (the proportional change in usage of the factor relative to the proportional change in total costsat constant factor prices), rj,n is the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to output and r,n is the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output.
As in Marshall's case, Le Chatelier's principle would suggest that releasing constraints on the importing of intermediate and capital inputs would lead to increased substitutability of labor for other factors and therefore an increase in the first term through the change in the Allen elasticity.
However, the product-demand elasticity no longer enters directly in the second "scale effect" term as it does in the competitive case. As Maurice and Ferguson acknowledge, it is unquestionably related to the difference between the elasticities of marginal revenue and marginal cost in the denominator. "However," they argue "the relation is a tenuous one, and it cannot be stated explicitly in meaningful economic terms."
Whether generally true or not, this does point out that strategic interactions among firms may make the link less direct than we may think. The sharply discontinuous marginal revenue curve emerging from Krishna's (1984) model of trade with a domestic/foreign duopoly is only one example.
The effect of increased competition
A vast simplification of Maurice and Ferguson's work can offer us some insights into the impact of the third effect, increasing competition. We return to the linearly homogenous case with constant marginal cost, which makes equation (1) above:
Intuitively, -an m% rise in marginal cost due to 'a I% orise in wages is translated into quantity along the marginal revenue curve which, given constant returns to scale, implies.
an equivalent percentage change in the demand for labor. Again, Le Chatelier's principle would seem to guarantee and increased elasticity with access to intermediate inputs through the first term. To see the effect of increased competition and product elasticity on ?lmr we draw on Bresnahan's (1989) and Porter's (1983) discussions of "conjectural variations" in firm behavior. We assume an individual firm maximizes profits:
where p(.) is the industry demand curve which is a function of industry output q, qi individual firm i's output, X is the impact of trade liberalization, c is the firm's constant returns to scale cost function, and w is the vector of market given factor prices. As
Bresnahan notes, outside of the competitive model, firms do not have supply curves in the sense of there being a solution for q as a function of p-c'(q). Instead price and quantitysetting conduct follow more general supply relations which can be written as mr = p(q, r) + p'(q, t)qic(r) = c'(qi, w, t) where a = q. The equation can be interpreted as narginal cost = the "perceived" , Dqp(,r,q) monopoly (Porter 1983) . Since product demand elasticity q(r) = p(r q)q, it is likely to be affected by any shock to the demand curve from trade reform.
5 qmV' can be found by taking the derivative of marginal revenue with respect to q:
Again, since we are working at the industry level, we follow Porter (1983) 
Intuitively, how much the elasticity of output, and hence labor demand rises differs in the oligopolistic vs. the competitive case depends on whether the percentage rise in price with a 1% rise in costs exceeds unity. In the perfectly competitive case where a = 0, the expression collapses to the elasticity of the demand curve and Marshall's law of derived demand. As we move toward monopoly, this is not necessarily so as the denominator suggests. It can be shown that 17,r,' is increasing in the output elasticity and in competitiveness where demand elasticities are decreasing in q. Higher product elasticities and more competitive market behavior move in this simplified model and under some additional assumptions, in the direction of higher derived demand elasticities. 6 An important exception occurs in the case of the frequently modeled and estimated isoelastic demand curve (qf = 0). In this case, changes in the degree of competitiveness.
have no impact on derived demand elasticities although price cost margins may fall.
What does trade liberalization do?
Even if effects through these channels were completely straightforward, the question then arises whether or not trade liberalization actually leads to changes of the kind generally postulated ie greater product elasticities, lower degrees of collusion, and greater substitutability of factors. The answer is, again, not always or maybe, not generaUy.
Tariff reductions that push the import price below the monopolists' preferred do reduce monopolistic control over importables prices and, in all probability, increase the product elasticity faced by importables producers (Baghwati 1965) . Quota reduction, even in this simplified situation, does not always have straightforward effect in either the competitive or non-competitive cases, particularly when the reduction is not complete. As
Baghwati noted, by virtue of merely displacing the home demand curve, reducing a quota but not eliminating it still leaves the domestic industry facing a downward sloping demand curve. It is easy to show in the linear case that elasticities may rise or fall with a partial quota reduction depending on the slope of the industry marginal cost curve. In the case of the isoelastic demand curve ( o = 0), by definition, shifting in the product demand curve has no impact on q unless the reduction is complete.'
We may still imagine that if the firms were not previously competitive, there might be a reduction in market power that would raise elasticities. This is also not obvious. As.
noted above, equation (2) shows that a partial reduction of quotas that leads to a fall in 0 in the isoelastic demand case leaves labor demand elasticities unchanged. More fundamentally, Krugman again highlights the importance of understanding the market structure even with the complete removal of quotas: Davidson (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and implicitly Krishna (1984) build models where because protection raises profitability in the absence of collusion it reduces the penalty for cheating on a collusive agreement-hence protection may actually increase competition. Although Krugman admits that the result is unsettling and perhaps improbable, quota reduction may increase 9.
Leaving this last perverse effect aside, we may console ourselves that most liberalizations have eliminated quotas. Yet, QRs are reincarnated in such varied guisesanti dumping suits, voluntary export restraints, environmental controls-that it is difficult not to assume that we really only "partially" liberalized and hence cannot be sure of the overall effect on product elasticities.
Non-tradeables and exportables?
It may also be important to think through the impact on perfectly competitive nontradeable firms for whom the primary influence of trade liberalization is to reduce input costs. At the simplest level, if demand curves remain unchanged (which they are unlikely with intercept zero will dictate no change in elasticity, a vertical supply curve an increase in elasticity and a horizontal supply curve a decrease.
8 to do in general equilibrium) the fall in output price would ithply lower demand elasticities along a linear demand curve. 4 For the large share of the work force in these industries, trade liberalization may reduce the elasticities they face.
Firms who can now break out of the domestic market and export may in addition face a less elastic world demand curve since there is no a priori reason to assume global and domestic tastes are identical. The expenditure share of their product in richer first world incomes is probably smaller, and hence the elasticity perhaps lower. Further, the larger external market may encourage specialization in a product that reduces its elasticity:
a local dinner wine becomes Penfold's Grange; peasant tent floor coverings become Persian Rugs; a traditional altiplano stimulant becomes a first world addiction.
Intermediate inputs
Finally, the one effect that appears pretty consistently in all the above exercises is that arising from substitution with other inputs, a. Here again, however, some caution is warranted in assuming that liberalization will increase substitutability. 
Entry and Exit Decisions
The own wage elasticity workers "face" is a combination of the reallocation decisions of continuing firms, as well as the entry/exit decisions of new or leaving firms. If restrictions on foreign investment are lifted and firms become more adept at comparing labor costs and moving from country to country, the exit elasticity of wages may grow significantly with liberalization. However, the labor demand relations estimated here and elsewhere cannot capture this latter effect, however important. Fajnzylber, Ribeiro and Maloney (2000) do attempt to measure this effect.
In sum, theory cannot be relied on to clinch the case that trade reforms have increased labor demand elasticities. We turn, therefore, to the empirical evidence.
Il. Data
We work with comparable firm level data from Colombia (1977 -1991 ), Mexico (1984 -1990 ), and Chile (1979 . The data sets to be used will be those prepared in the context of the World Bank funded project "Industrial Competition, Productivity, and Their
Relation to Trade Regimes" (Roberts and Tybout, 1996) .5 These data sets have several advantages that set them above any other work done to date.
1. They have broad micro-level coverage, including most manufacturing lower elasticity.
TIn the case of Chile, the original data set was updated to cover the period after 1986, using infornation establishments with at least ten employees, and have been "cleaned" on a consistent basis.
Working at this level permits more precise estimation as well as permitting wages to be taken as exogenous.
2. Panels that follow firms over time permit studying the dynamics of the employment adjustment process. They also provide lagged values to serve as instruments for potentially endogenous variables. Finally, they permit controlling for the existence of plant-specific effects that may be correlated with explanatory variables.
3. The data sets provide consistent coverage across 3 countries in Latin America:
Chile, Colombia, Mexico. Our maximum span is 17 years for Chile. Though Slaughter's U.S. series permitted the estimated substitution elasticities to evolve over several decades of trade integration, our data spans periods of dramatic changes in trade regimes. We deal with one case of extreme liberalization (Mexico) and two of renewed protectionism followed by re-liberalization. : 1984-1990 In 1985, the De la Madrid government undertook a restructuring of the external sector preceded in magnitude only by Chile's reforms of the mid 1970s. (Lustig 1992, Maloney and Azevedo 1995) Import licensing was cut to a quarter of previous levels while maximum import tariffs fell 50% and became more unified. The liberalization process would continue under NAFTA into the 1 990s. The initial liberalization was accompanied by a sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate which mitigated the reduction in protection. Over the course of the early 1990s, a steady appreciation would lead to an provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (Santiago, Chile).
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increasing competitive pressure qn the,tradeables sector. Although the bulk of the reforms had been taken before our sample begins, arguably the impact was worked out exactly.
over our period of study. : 1979-1995: In the context of wide ranging and profound structural reforms, Chile gradually 
Chile
IV. Dynamic Panel Modeling
The theoretical discussion above does not leave us with a particular functional form to estimate so we depart from a reasonably standard log linear autoregressive specification (see Hammermesh 1993, Sevestre and Trognon 1996) :
The log of employment in firm i in period t is a function of lagged employment, a vector of the logs of the skilled and unskilled wages in the firm (wi), and industry output (to capture cyclical effects), time varying levels effects that affect all firms equally, individual 'fixed" effects, and a random error term. Firm level output is omitted since we are If at least one of the explanatory variables is truly exogenous, Balestra and Nerlove (1966), its lags can be used as instruments and will yield consistent estimates. However, in the present case, it is difficult to assume that either wages, or output are uncorrelated with [L. As an example, larger output firms tend to use more sophisticated production techniques. These also require a more reliable or skilled work force which will show up as 14 receiving a higher wage. 6 Both output and the observed wage are therefore correlated with the unobserved "sophistication" of the production technology.
Following Anderson and Hsiao (1982) , we therefore difference the data to eliminate Iii, yielding our base specification Unless the idiosyncratic error followed a random walk, this differencing necessarily gives
the transformed error an MA(+) structure that is correlated with the differenced LDV.
This can be overcome by using lags of greater than t-4 as instruments. We follow Arellano and Bond 's (1991) employment of additional lags as instruments to improve the efficiency of the estimates in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) context.
We instrument lagged differenced employment with its lag and with second and further lags of capital stocks or output. Though we attempted to instrument for any remaining endogeneity in wages, the results, as with Roberts and Skoufias and Maloney and Ribeiro, were poor and counterintuitive and in the end we do not instrument for them. As we instrument lagged differenced employment with its lag, we lose three years of data in each panel. This is not so much of a problem in Colombia where the sample begins substantially before the change in regime. In Mexico we lose 1984-86, the period when most reforms were occurring. However, the full impact of these changes was probably not instantaneous and the exchange rate appreciated sharply across the period so the experiment is still of interest. The Chilean data now begins in 1982, the last year of the extremely open trade regime -before the economic collapse. The several year period of greater protectionism that followed and then the re-liberalization after make this period.
interesting. Though seemingly logical measures of increased integration, these measures have two disadvantages. First, theoretically, it is not necessary for trade to actually occur for the domestic agent's behavior to change, the threat is enough (Bhagwati, 1965) . Hence very small or no observed imports may nonetheless be associated with large changes in industrial structure. Second, customary measures of competition are extremely noisy.
Measures
In Chile, the data after 1986 do not* have a sectoral identification code and hence these variables cannot be calculated.
Observed Competitiveness: (price-cost margin)
. This measure of monopoly rents appear to be paying more for the workers.
proxies for the degree of monopoly power. Empirically, Harrison (1994) and Levinsohn (1993) argued that observed falls in price-cost margins following liberalization imply more elastic product demand.
In the estimations, these variables are included free standing and as interactive variables on the relevant elasticity. This provides for a more direct testing procedure than that used by To begin, we include yearly dummies and interactive terms on all variables, reported in the column below each variable. This is the most straightforward way of testing for structural break in the labor demand equations across time. Wald tests, both on whether the set of dunmmies for a any given year is significant (Specification Wald), and whether the set of timne dummies on any particular variable is significant (Variable Wald), are reported in the penultimate column and in the last row respectively. It is necessary to recall that by definition of the 5% level of confidence, there is a 50% chance that ten time dummies will generate at least one rejection of the null of no change where there is, in fact, no structural break. Throughout the discussion we refer to the absolute value of the own wage elasticities i.e., -.5 is greater than -.3. The calculation of the long run elasticity is standard: the sum of the impact elasticities (coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged wage) divided by unity minus the coefficient on lagged employment.
The difference GMM specifications are largely satisfactory. For all countries, the Sargan tests are of acceptable values and the presence of second order serial correlation is rejected. The base specifications for each country offer plausible values for the long run own elasticities most central to analysis and their constituent elements, the lagged dependent variables.
Time Dummies
Chile: In sum, there is no strong evidence from these regressions that liberalization has led to greater LR own wage elasticities.
Openness Proxies
Tables 7-12 present the results of the same specification, but adding to the time dummies explicit measures of liberalization described above. Most variables were included both free standing and as interactive variables with the exception of economy wide variables which had no cross sectional variation.
Chile:
In the trade policy specification, both the interactive terms on the tariff rate and the real exchange rates show significance on either the contemporaneous or lagged own wage coefficient, and the variable Wald tests show marginal significance. However, counterintuitively, higher tariff protection appears to raise the elasticity as does a depreciation of the exchange rate. A higher price cost margin appears to affect the specification at a high level of statistical significance but has no effect on the own wage coefficients. Counterintuitively, rising profit margins are correlated with a significant rise in the coefficient on lagged employment and thus with a higher long run own elasticity.
For white collar workers, table 8 suggests that a depreciation of the real exchange rate has the counterintuitive effect of increasing the own wage elasticity with both the specification and variable Wald tests strongly significant. Price cost margins do not have significant effects on either the short nor the long run employment response to own wage changes.
In sum, there is little evidence of more openmess leading to higher long run own wage elasticities.
Colombia:
Among the trade policy variables, only the real exchange rate has an effect on the blue collar elasticity and in the direction predicted. Both the combined coefficients on the own wage and the reduction in the coefficient on lagged employment move to reduce the long run elasticity. This effect is supported again in the trade flows specification. Here however, increased imports counter-intuitively appear to shorten the adjustment period and reduce the long run elasticity. Increased exports do seem to lead to higher short run and long run elasticities. The price cost margin lengthens the adjustment period with the effect of increasing the long run own elasticity.
For white collar workers, the only significant coefficient in the trade policy 21 specification is that on the lagged dependent variable-a more depreciated currency decreases long run own elasticity. In the trade flows specification, both increased exports and imports do decrease the short run own elasticity although the specification Wald tests are only marginally significant. The statistically significant increase in the coefficient on lagged employment has the impact of increasing the long run elasticity as price cost margins rise.
Overall, Colombia provides some evidence in favor of the Rodrik hypothesis, but the results are still highly mixed.
Mexico:
For blue collar workers, product tariffs have an indeterminate effect, counterintuitively increasing the short run elasticities but reducing the coefficient on lagged employment. Evaluated at the variable means, an increase in tariffs of one standard deviation lowers the demand elasticities as predicted. In Mexico, the data also allow for the construction of a variable for protection of inputs. The impact of higher input tariffs is also indeterminate but when evaluated at the variable means, a one standard deviation increase in tariffs leads to a lowering of elasticities. As section II argues, theoretically, it is not obvious that this should be the case but the finding is broadly consistent with Rodrik's argument. Neither the non-trade barriers variable nor the real exchange rate appear significantly. Increased imports do appear to have the predicted effect on the short and long run elasticities although the specification Wald test is not significant. The real exchange rate again does not affect short run own wage elasticities but by decreasing the coefficient on lagged employment, it effectively does reduce the total elasticity as 22 predicted. As for price cost margins, they have no significant effects on either the short run or the long run elasticity.
For white collar workers, no tariff variable has any impact on the own wage elasticities although the exchange rate has the opposite of the predicted effect through the lagged own wage. No trade flow variable has any impact, but the real exchange rate does have the predicted effect here through reducing the coefficient on lagged employment.
Further, non-trade barriers do decrease long run elasticities through the coefficient on lagged employment. Increased prices cost margins appear to increase the own wage elasticity.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that the case that trade liberalization should increase own wage elasticities, while compelling in the case of competitive import competing industries, is perhaps less so in the frequent case of imperfectly competitive, non-tradeable, or even export industries. It has then tested the hypothesis using establishment level panel data from three countries with periods of liberalization.
The results show that estimates of elasticities do change greatly in magnitude, if not significantly so, across time and that comparisons across countries should take this into account when attempting to make inference about the flexibility or efficiency of labor markets. But more importantly, the data provide only very mixed support for the idea that trade liberalization has an impact on own wage elasticities and no consistent patterns emerge. If globalization is making the lives of workers more insecure, it is probably working through some other mechanism than that examined here.
Appendix I. Notes on the Fundamental Law of Labor Demand
The "Fundamental Law of Labor Demand"(FLFD) 7 used in most discussions of the topic is generally derived from the cost function. Since we are interested in the impact of an economy wide rise in labor costs, as opposed to idiosyncratic ones, we follow Hamermesh in aggregating to the industry level. From Shepherd's lemma applied to any homothetic cost function: 
